"सत्य" च्या विविध आवृत्यांमधील फरक

८ बाइट्स वगळले ,  ११ वर्षांपूर्वी
छो
correction as हेसुद्धा पाहा, replaced: हे सुद्धा पहा → हेसुद्धा पाहा using AWB
छो (r2.5.2) (सांगकाम्याने वाढविले: pfl:Waahaid)
छो (correction as हेसुद्धा पाहा, replaced: हे सुद्धा पहा → हेसुद्धा पाहा using AWB)
{{see|Veritas|Aletheia}}
The English word ''[[:wikt:truth|truth]]'' is from [[Old English]] ''tríewþ, tréowþ, trýwþ'', [[Middle English]] ''trewþe'', cognate to [[Old High German]] ''triuwida'', [[Old Norse]] ''tryggð''. Like ''[[troth]]'', it is a ''[[:wikt:-th|-th]]'' nominalisation of the adjective ''true'' (Old English ''tréowe'').
 
 
The English word ''[[:wikt:true|true]]'' is from Old English ([[West Saxon]]) ''(ge)tríewe, [[:wikt:treowe|tréowe]]'', cognate to [[Old Saxon]] ''(gi)trûui'', [[Old High German]] ''(ga)triuwu'' ([[Modern German]] ''treu'' "faithful"), [[Old Norse]] ''tryggr'', [[Gothic language|Gothic]] ''triggws'',<ref>see [[Holtzmann's law]] for the ''-ww-'' : ''-gg-'' alternation.</ref> all from a [[Proto-Germanic]] ''*trewwj-'' "having [[good faith]]".
[[Constructivist epistemology|Social constructivism]] holds that truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it does not reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold). Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of physical and biological reality, including [[Race (classification of human beings)|race]], [[Human sexuality|sexuality]], and [[gender]] are socially constructed.
 
[[Giambattista Vico]] was among the first to claim that history and culture were man-made. Vico's [[epistemology|epistemological]] orientation gathers the most diverse rays and unfolds in one axiom{{ndash}} ''verum ipsum factum''{{ndash}} "truth itself is constructed". [[Hegel]] and [[Marx]] were among the other early proponents of the premise that truth is, or can be, socially constructed. Marx, like many critical theorists who followed, did not reject the existence of objective truth but rather distinguished between true knowledge and knowledge that has been distorted through power or ideology. For Marx scientific and true knowledge is 'in accordance with the dialectical understanding of history' and ideological knowledge 'an epiphenomenal expression of the relation of material forces in a given economic arrangement'.<ref> May, Todd, 1993, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, politics in the thought of Michel Foucault' with reference to Althusser and Balibar, 1970</ref>
 
==== Consensus theory ====
[[William James|William James's]] version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving."<ref name=WJP>James, William, ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism','' (1909).</ref> By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic").
 
[[John Dewey]], less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time ''if'' openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Dewey, John", auth [[Richard J. Bernstein]], p383 (Macmillan, 1969) </ref>
 
=== Minimalist (deflationary) theories ===
 
A number of philosophers reject the thesis that the concept or term ''truth'' refers to a real property of sentences or propositions. These philosophers are responding, in part, to the common use of ''truth predicates'' (e.g., that some particular thing "...is true") which was particularly prevalent in philosophical discourse on truth in the first half of the 20th century. From this point of view, to assert the proposition “'2 + 2 = 4' is true” is logically equivalent to asserting the proposition “2 + 2 = 4”, and the phrase “is true” is completely dispensable in this and every other context. These positions are broadly described
* as ''deflationary'' theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words "true" or ''truth'',
* as ''disquotational'' theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or
* as ''minimalist'' theories of truth.<ref name=EPT/><ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book.</ref>
 
Several of the major theories of truth hold that there is a particular property the having of which makes a belief or proposition true. Pluralist theories of truth assert that there may be more than one property that makes propositions true: ethical propositions might be true by virtue of coherence. Propositions about the physical world might be true by corresponding to the objects and properties they are about.
 
Some of the pragmatic theories, such as those by [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Charles Peirce]] and [[William James]], included aspects of correspondence, coherence and constructivist theories.<ref name="Peirce Truth and Falsity"/><ref name=WJP/> [[Crispin Wright]] argued in his 1992 book ''Truth and Objectivity'' that any predicate which satisfied certain platitudes about truth qualified as a truth predicate. In some discourses, Wright argued, the role of the truth predicate might be played by the notion of superassertibility.<ref>Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.</ref> [[Michael Lynch (philosopher)|Michael Lynch]], in a 2009 book ''Truth as One and Many'', argued that we should see truth as a functional property capable of being multiply manifested in distinct properties like correspondence or coherence. <ref>Truth as One and Many (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).</ref>
 
== Formal theories ==
=== Semantic theory of truth ===
The [[semantic theory of truth]] has as its general case for a given language:
:'P' is true if and only if P
where 'P' is a reference to the sentence (the sentence's name), and P is just the sentence itself.
 
: the dichotomy between 'absolute = perfect' and 'relative = imperfect' has been superseded in all fields of scientific thought, where "it is generally recognized that there is no absolute truth but nevertheless that there are objectively valid laws and principles".
 
: In that respect, "a scientifically or rationally valid statement means that the power of reason is applied to all the available data of observation without any of them being suppressed or falsified for the sake of a desired result". The history of science is "a history of inadequate and incomplete statements, and every new insight makes possible the recognition of the inadequacies of previous propositions and offers a springboard for creating a more adequate formulation."
 
: As a result "the history of thought is the history of an ever-increasing approximation to the truth. Scientific knowledge is not absolute but optimal; it contains the optimum of truth attainable in a given historical period." Fromm furthermore notes that "different cultures have emphasized various aspects of the truth" and that increasing interaction between cultures allows for these aspects to reconcile and integrate, increasing further the approximation to the truth.
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== हेसुद्धा पाहा ==
== हे सुद्धा पहा ==
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* [http://www.formalontology.it/aletheia.htm History of Truth: The Greek "Aletheia"]
* [http://www.formalontology.it/veritas.htm History of Truth: The Latin "Veritas"]
 
 
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